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Mike Gifford has done a good job of outlining how the Uruguay  Round multilateral
trade agreement  has changed the rules governing  the ways in which national  governments
are allowed to interfere with and engage in international  commerce  (IATRC,  1994; Josling,
Tangermann and Warley,  1996; Meilke,  McClatchy and de Gorter, 1996).  While the rules
governing trade  in primary agricultural products  continue  to differ  from those governing
trade  in  manufactured  products,  most observers  would agree  that progress  was made  in
"normalizing"  trading relations  for agricultural  products  by:  1) eliminating  all non-tariff
barriers  to trade;  2)  banning  the use of export  subsidies  on  commodities  which  are  not
explicitly identified in a countries World Trade Organization  (WTO)  schedule; 3) reducing
export subsidies on all commodities;  4) reducing all tariffs and the binding of most agrifood
tariffs;  and  5)  developing  an improved  dispute settlement  mechanism  that applies  to  all
products.
ANTI-DUMPING  (AD)  AND  COUNTERVAILING  DUTY (CVD)  DISPUTES
There  are two  types of disputes  which will be taken  to the  WTO.  First,  disputes
alleging that countries  are not abiding by the obligations they assumed with the signing of
the Uruguay Round agreement (nullification,  impairment, circumvention).  Second, disputes
governed by the Agreement on Subsidies  and Countervailing Measures, the Agreement  on
Implementation  of Article  VI  of  GATT  1994  (anti-dumping)  and  the  Agreement  on
Agriculture.  My comments  are focused on the second type of dispute which deals primarily
with anti-dumping and countervailing  duty actions.
Anti-dumping actions are brought by domestic producers  against foreign firms.  The
original intent was to combat predatory pricing (Boltuck and Litan,  1991; USITC,  1995).
Predatory pricing is the practice of a firm selling products below cost to drive out rival firms
thereby  creating  a market  power  for itself.  Its market  power position  then  allows  it to
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description of  predatory pricing should be sufficient to suggest that it will never be successful
for agrifood products  and uncommon outside of the agricultural sector (Shin,  1994).  Instead,
anti-dumping provisions  are  generally  used to combat  international price  discrimination.
Interestingly,  price  discrimination  is perfectly  legal  if practiced  by  domestic  firms,  and
applauded internally when used by the Canadian Wheat  Board (CWB) to benefit Canadian
grain producers.  Schott (1994, p.  85) has described the Uruguay  Round agreement on anti-
dumping as "a bandage to a festering sore  of trade policy."
The economic  basis for a  CVD complaint  is different  than  for an AD  action.  A
countervailing  duty  case  is brought  by domestic  firms  against  foreign  governments.  As
Horlick  (1991,  p.  137)  notes,  "there  is  a  grain of truth,  which is the  distortion  caused by
subsidies"  lying  behind the rationale  for a CVD, while AD actions  are  "90  percent pure
protectionist."  Essentially,  domestic  firms should not be expected  to compete  against the
treasuries of foreign governments.
Significant changes were made in AD/CVD laws  as a result of the Uruguay Round
of trade  negotiations.  For  CVD  investigations  the  changes  include:  1)  specific  time
schedules for decisions; 2) a higher de minimis level; 3) a five year sunset provision; 4) the
opportunity  for consumers of the foreign product to make representations;  5) different rules
for  developing  nations;  and  6)  an appeals  process  (Schott  1994,  Jackson  1996).  Most
importantly, WTO panel reports cannot be blocked from adoption,  except by consensus.  The
WTO rules governing AD and CVD actions  are not self-executing,  hence these procedures
must be incorporated  into domestic legislation.
ADMINISTERIAL  PROTECTION RULES
Before proceeding,  it is useful to ask what desirable  features countries would like to
see embodied  in administered  protection rules.  Of course,  countries can be schizophrenic
depending  on whether they are protecting domestic  industries or challenging other nations
"unfair"  trading practices.  However,  there  are  at  least  four  desirable  features,  of the
administered protection  rules, on which there would be general agreement:
The proceedings  should be "rules based".  The criteria  for determining if a subsidy or
practice  is illegal  should be stable, well defined and  straightforward.  While there will
always be "grey areas" these should be kept to the minimum by using language that is as
clear  as possible.  The  "creative  ambiguity"  mentioned  by  Gifford  (1997) should  be
avoided.  Clear  rules  should also  limit the number of frivolous  cases brought  before
panels.
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· Rulings  should be predictable.  Predictability  is enhanced when the number of potential
"courts" in which a case can be heard is limited.  An industry  should be protected from
double jeopardy and  endless litigation.
There should be a time schedule  for panel findings that insures the resolution of  disputes
in a timely fashion.
· For AD/CVD cases the arguments, evidence and findings should be consistent with basic
economic theory (van Duren,  1991; Meilke and Sarker,  1996).
THE AGRI-FOOD  INDUSTRY
As  Gifford (1997)  has  mentioned,  progress was made  on most of the issues raised
above,  in the Uruguay Round.  However,  based  on these  common-sense  criteria  there  is
reason for concern with the current arrangements  for administered protection.  The issues are
important  for agri-food producers  because  they are heavy users of this form of protection.
About one-half of  the cases brought to the WTO since its inception have involved agri-food
products and two of the three extraordinary  challenges under the CUSTA have involved agri-
food (pork, live swine, softwood lumber) (Endsley  1995,  Dixit 1996).
Historically, the United States, Canada, the European Union and Australia have been
the principle users of contingency protection legislation.  However, more than forty countries
now have domestic administered protection rules. As developing nations increase  their use
of administered protection,  domestically  and through the WTO,  the proportion of agri-food
disputes is likely to increase.
The  WTO  embodies  new  rules  which  classifies  subsidies  into three  groups:  1)
prohibited;  2) actionable;  and  3)  non-actionable.  However,  the  list of subsidies  differs
greatly among manufactured  goods and agri-food products  (Table  1 and Table 2).
The rules governing Canada's external trading relations are further  complicated by
its membership in the NAFTA.  Consider a case brought against Canada by the United States
and Mexico.  Mexico and the United  States would have to decide whether to bring the case
under NAFTA or the WTO, but not both (Endsley,  1995).  If they chose to pursue the case
under NAFTA, two panels would be formed.  One governing the Canada-Mexico  case and
one governing the Canada-United  States case.  Alternatively,  if both Mexico and the United
States brought separate cases under domestic legislation,  they could also simultaneously  file
a case with the WTO (Cadsby and Woodside,  1996).  To an  economist, but perhaps not to
a lawyer, this  is an exceedingly  complex arrangement with a high likelihood of generating
conflicting decisions.  If NAFTA is eventually expanded to include more countries, as seems
undeniable, the process  will get even more cumbersome  without fundamental  institutional
changes.
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Table  1.  WTO  Rules  as  they Apply  to  Subsidies  and Countervailing Measures:
Manufactured Products
Prohibited Subsidies:
* Government Transfers of Funds, Revenue Foregone  or Provision of Services  other
than General Infrastructure to a Specific Industry
*  Income or Price Support
*  Export  Subsidies
*  Domestic Use Regulations
Actionable  Subsidies:
*  Ad Valorem  Subsidization Exceeds 5 percenta
* Subsidies to Cover an Industries  Operating Lossesa
*  Forgiveness  of Government Held Debta
Non-Actionable  Subsidies:
* Generally Available  Subsidies
* Specific Subsidies  Which Met the Following  Conditions:
* ad valorem subsidization  less than  1 percent
* assistance  for research activities  if the assistance covers not more than 75
percent of the costs of industrial research or 50 percent of the costs of pre-
competitive development  activityb
* assistance to disadvantaged  regions,  based on specified  development  criteriab
* assistance to promote adoption of existing  facilities to new environmental
requirements,  provided the  assistance  is limited to 20 percent of the cost of
adaptionb
a  These  subsidies must  be  shown to have trade effects  as described  in the Agreement  on
Subsidies  and Countervailing Measures.
b  Other conditions apply.
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Table 2.  WTO  Rules  as they  Apply  to Subsidies  and Countervailing  Measures:
Agriculture
Prohibited Subsidies:
*  Export Subsidies  on Products not Identified in the Countries  Schedule of Commitments
Actionable  Subsidies:
*  Ad Valorem Product Specific  Support Exceeds 5 percent
*  Ad Valorem Product Specific  Support  1  percent -5 percent"
*  Ad Valorem Non-Specificb  Support Exceeds  1 percenta
*  Direct Payments  under Production Limiting Programsa
*  Export  Subsidies on Products  Specified in the Countries Schedule of Commitmentsa
Non-Actionable  Subsidies:
*  Generally  Available  Subsidies
*  Ad Valorem Subsidization Less than  1%
*  General  Services:
* research
* pest and disease control
* training services
* extension and advisory  services
* inspection services
* marketing and promotion services
* infrastructure
*  Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes
*  Domestic Food Aid
*  Direct Payments to Producers through Decoupled Income  Support
*  Government  Financial Participation  in income insurance and income safety-net programs
* Payments  for Relief from Natural Disasters




*  Payments Under Environmental Programs
*  Payments Under Regional Assistance  Programs
* Specific  Subsidies which Meet the Following Conditions:
* assistance  for research activities if the assistance  covers not more than 75 percent of
the costs of industrial research or 50 percent of the costs of pre-competitive
development  activity
* assistance to disadvantaged  regions, based on specified development criteria
* assistance to promote  adoption of existing facilities to new environmental
requirements,  provided the assistance is limited to 20 percent of the cost of adaption.
a With a determination of "injury" and "due restraint" must be shown in bringing a case.
b The term non-specific is used in the context  of Article  6 of the Agreement  on Agriculture.
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There  are  many forces  of change  pushing the dispute  settlement  system in various
directions.  National  governments,  and  experts  such  as  Mike Gifford  who  have  a  deep
understanding of  the institutional  issues involved,  need to think about how to create the most
fair,  liberal  and  efficient  mechanism  as possible - and  how to  stick-handle the  political
sovereignty  issues involved.  A list of "forces"  includes the  following:
The rules governing trade  in agri-food  products will become increasingly like those
governing trade in manufactured  products.  The Uruguay Round agreement sets this
process in motion and there will be no turning back.  In the meantime,  mechanisms
are  needed to insure countries  live  up to their commitments and  to define the  grey
areas in the agreements.
Regional  Integration Agreements  (RIA) will be enlarged  in North America, Europe
(and  in Asia,  but more  slowly)  creating trading blocks  which  are  subject to  more
liberal  trading rules  than  those  governing  trade  between non-block  countries.  In
North America, there will be  increasing pressure to form a common market instead
of a  free  trade  area;  agri-food  is  likely  to  be one  of the  major  stumbling  blocks
towards progress.
The growth and deepening  of regional integration  agreements will increasingly blur
the distinction  among domestic and  foreign firms.
These  forces will push the evolution of an efficient dispute settlement mechanism  in
two directions.  First, disputes occurring between  countries,  which are not in the same RIA,
should be heard and settled in the WTO.  Second,  disputes among members of the same RIA,
where trade  is subject  to more liberal  trading rules than  in the  WTO, should be heard and
settled  by  RIA  panels.  National  administered  protection  agencies  should  become
"transparency"  agents along the  lines suggested  by Meilke  and Sarker (1996) and  Spriggs
(1994).  Their role  would be to "filter"  cases  before they proceeded  to either the  RIA or
WTO dispute settlement  bodies.  National  administered protection  agencies,  given  a new
mandate,  could  play  an  important  "informal"  role  in  examining  and  negotiating  trade
irritants.  However,  this suggests the elimination of purely domestic  contingency protection
legislation, and no matter the arguments on efficiency grounds, this will be a difficult concept
to sell in many countries.
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